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TAXATION - FEDERAL EsTATE TAX - GIFT IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH - Decedent, when eighty years old and while still in good health, set
up an irrevocable trust of one-third of his property, with a life estate to his
daughter and remainder over on the daughter's death to her children and
descendants. Under the trust deed the income was to be accumulated and
added to the principal until the donor's death. The Supreme Court found that
decedent, who was thinking about speculating on the stock exchange, was
anxious to insure adequate provision for his daughter and her descendants upon
his death, and that he therefore determined to make an irrevocable disposition
of a substantial portion of his property in their favor and thereby avoid the
hazards and uncertainties to which testamentary gifts would be subject because
of possible shrinkage and depletion of his estate due to losses on the stock market.
Decedent died about five and one-half years after the gift was made. The commissioner assessed additional taxes against the estate on the theory that the
gift by trust was in contemplation of death within the meaning of § 302 (c)
of the Revenue Act of 1926.1 The Board of Tax Appeals reversed the commissioner's determination in a memorandum decision. 2 The Circuit Court
of Appeals, by a two to one decision, reversed the board and upheld the commissioner. 3 Held, with one justice dissenting, that the board's decision should be
affirmed and the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, since the "mere purpose
to make provision for children after a donor's death is not enough conclusively
to establish that action to that end was 'in contemplation of death.' " Colorado
National Bank v. Commissioner, (U. S. 1938) 59 S. Ct. 48.
The provision in the federal estate tax law requiring inclusion in the gross
estate of inter vivas gifts made by the decedent in contemplation of death, while
obviously designed to prevent avoidance of the estate tax, has created a difficult
problem of interpretation for the federal courts. In United States v. Wells,4
the leading case on the construction of this language, the Court made it clear
that this clause was not limited in its application to gifts causa mortis, but was
intended to reach all cases where the dominant motive for making the gift
during decedent's lifetime was associated with a purpose relating to his death
rather than life. 5 Thus, to cite a few illustrations, gifts are deemed to be moti144 Stat. L. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. (1935), § 4u (c).
2 Estate of Edwin B. Hendrie; Colorado National Bank, 34 B. T. A. 1315
(1936).
8 Commissioner v. Colorado National Bank, (C. C. A. 10th 1938) 95 F. (2d) 160.
¼ 283 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931).
5 "The words 'in contemplation of death' mean that the thought of death is the
impelling cause of the transfer, and while the belief in the imminence of death may
afford convincing evidence, the statute is not to be limited, and its purpose thwarted,
by a rule of construction which in place of contemplation of death makes the final
criterion to be an apprehension that death is 'near at hand.'
"If it is the thought of death, as a controlling motive prompting the disposition
of property, that affords the test, it follows that th~ statute does not embrace gifts inter
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vated by purposes associated with the life of the decedent where the beneficiaries
stand in immediate need of the donor's help, 6 or where the donor habitually
makes gifts to his children in order to develop their sense of responsibility and
skill in the handling of property,7 or where the donor wishes to avoid income
taxes. 8 On the other hand, and again by way of illustration, gifts are deemed
to be motivated by purposes relating to the decedent's death where the purpose
is to avoid estate taxes, 9 or where the donor wishes to avoid an anticipated
contest over his will.10 The test applied in the Wells case and followed in
subsequent decisions is far from satisfactory: it emphasizes the subjective element entering into the gift together with all the speculation and conjecture
suggested by an inquiry into motive plus the splendid opportunity furnished
lawyers and their clients for "building up" an impressive array of evidence
designed to emphasize the association of the gift with purposes of life; furthermore, the test, with its emphasis on the "impelling cause of the transfer," 11
implies an evaluation and weighing of various motives entering into the gift to
ascertain which one is dominant.12 In the principal case the decedent's beneficial purpose was to take care of his dependents after death. The gift, therefore,
appeared to be associated with a purpose relating to decedent's death. However,
not every inter vivas transfer creating a gift over effective upon the death of
the donor is necessarily a gift in contemplation of death, according to the federal
courts, since the motive in making the transfer at a particular time may be
associated with purposes relating to life. And in the principal case a motive
associated with life was found by the Court in the decedent's desire to protect
the beneficiaries against the risks involved in playing the market.18 Thus the
oioos which spring from a different motive." Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the

majority, in United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 at II8, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931).
6 Llewellyn v. United States, (D. C. Tenn. 1929) 40 F. (2d) 555.
7 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931).
8 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Becker, (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 851.
9 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 916.
10 Green, Exrs. of Dupignac Estate, 6 B. T. A. 278 (1927).
11 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446 (1931).
12 For a very interesting discussion of this question, see the opinion in Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 794. In that case it
appeared that the two chief motives of the gift were to avoid income taxes and estate
taxes. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the correctness of the trial court's ruling
to the effect that if there were several motives for making the gift and the motive
of avoiding the estate tax played a substantial part in causing the transfer, the jury
should find the transfer to be in contemplation of death. The court rejected the notion
that the Wells case requires the motive associated with death to be the most impelling
or the dominant motive before the gift can be said to be in contemplation of death.
18 A second possible motive for making the transfer at that time and in that
particular form is that the settlor did not consider the size of the corpus sufficient to
yield the desired amount of income, and merely used his death as the time when the
accumulation of income to the corptJs should cease, having assumed that then the
principal would be large enough to produce income sufficient for the beneficiaries'
needs. Such a plan would be roughly equivalent to a deferred payment annuity
insurance policy. However, it does not appear that this motive was present in the
instant case.

34°

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 37

case emphasizes that it is not the ultimate beneficial purpose of the gift, but the
motive for making the transfer at a particular time during the decedent's life
which is the decisive factor. When it is considered that decedent was eighty
years old, it is rather difficult to believe that the fear of depletion of the donor's
estate because of contemplated stock market speculations was really a substantial
motive.14 Nevertheless, it was for the Board of Tax Appeals to determine what
weight and probative effect was to be accorded to this evidence relating to
motive.15 Certainly it is probable that some of the justices voting in favor of
reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals did so primarily because they thought
that court exceeded its authority in reversing the determination of the Board
of Tax Appeals on a question of fact when there was evidence in the record to
support the board's finding.
Edmund O'Hare

14 The dissenting opinion is further supported by the fact that the terms of the
trust correspond to the terms of the donor's will. It has been held that under such
circumstances the gift is part of a general testamentary scheme and therefore in contemplation of death. See Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co. v. McCaughn, (C. C. A.
3d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 602.
15 See MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, rev. ed., 448-450 (1938).

